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Нuman factors in aviation: history and definitions
Aircraft accidents are infrequent, highly visible, and often involve massive loss of life, resulting in exhaustive investigation into causal factors, public reports, and remedial action. Research by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration into aviation accidents has found that 70% involve human error. [12; 14]. The aforementioned numbers refer to certified personnel of commercial aviation. Taking into account aviation of general use, technical service, management of aircraft, infrastructure of transport complex proportion of human factor will be more than 90% [4].
Accident records show a flattening of the safety curve since the early Seventies: instead of new kinds of accident, similar safety deficiencies have become recurrent features in accident reports. Human behaviour and performance are cited as causal factors in the majority of aircraft accidents. If the accident rate is to be decreased, human factors must be better understood and the knowledge more broadly applied. This suggests the need to review traditional accident prevention strategies, focused almost exclusively on the action or inaction’s of front-line operational personnel. Therefore, human factors became the object of deep research [1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7; 8].
Human factors involves gathering information about human abilities, limitations, and other characteristics and applying it to tools, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments to produce safe, comfortable, and effective human use. In aviation, human factors is dedicated to better understanding how humans can most safely and efficiently be integrated with the technology. Human factors is a large and complex subject and a full or detailed coverage of the topic is beyond the scope of this article. The objective of this paper is to give a layman’s general explanation of the history, development and application of human factors, particularly as it relates to safety investigations of aircraft accidents and incidents.  
The practice of applied human factors was clearly being practiced in aviation some 50 years before it was given a title. The investigation of accidents and catastrophes caused by human began in the XIX century in the railway industry. In the early years of aviation, it could reasonably be said that, more often than not, the aircraft killed the pilot. That is, the aircrafts were intrinsically unforgiving and, relative to their modern counterparts, mechanically unsafe. [13] However, with the birth of aviation the understanding of role of personal qualities of the pilot during the flight rose. Since it was known very early on in aviation history that the pilot ‘failed’ significantly more often than the plane did, most aircraft accidents were classified as «pilot error» and often the explanation went little further than that. The use of the term «pilot error» provides a simple, but often misleading explanation of a complex accident sequence. 
Some would have us believe that human error and «pilot error» are synonymous. Yet, simply writing off aviation accidents merely to pilot error is an overly simplistic, if not naive, approach to accident causation. After all, it is well established that accidents cannot be attributed to a single cause, or in most instances, even a single individual [11].
In 1910 G. Musterberg introduced the term «personal factor», meaning human mistakes made during the management of aircraft. N. Zhukovskiy same year pointed out that pilot’s personal characteristics were directly connected with his professional security. Eight years later it was proposed to consider personal factor during the analysis of aircraft accidents. Later S. Gellershtein in the 1930-s provided a definition to personal factor as complex of inborn and acquired physical and psychical qualities of personality, which can be connected with reasons of genesis, character of development and results of aircraft accident. [4].
The term «human factors» was used informally in literature in British Royal Air Force accident investigation reports in the 1940s, (ATSB Human Factors training material) it was not until 1957 that it was first formally used to describe the modern practice [10].The term was used to refer to the application of scientific knowledge, concepts, models, and theories derived mainly from human science disciplines such as psychology, physiology, medicine, anthropometrics and others. The knowledge was applied to improving the efficiency of operation and the reduction of human error leading to aircraft accidents.  
While views do vary, the term «human factors» has become the generally accepted term within the aviation community, and many consider ergonomics to be a narrower field of study associated with equipment design and construction to better interact with the abilities and limitations of the operators, to be a subset of the broader discipline of human factors. Essentially, the objective of human factors is to optimise the relationship between the human operator, technology and the environment.  
Е. Edwards defined human factors (ergonomics) in the following words: «Human factors (or ergonomics) may be defined as the technology concerned to optimize the relationship between people and their activities by the systematic application of the human sciences, integrated within a framework of system engineering»[10; p 9]. 
J. M. Christensen, D.A Topmiller and R. T. Gill, define human factors as follows: «Human factors is an eclectic field encompassing disciplines such as psychology, engineering, ergonomics, anthropometry and psychophysiology. Specifically, human factors is that branch of science and technology that includes what is known and theorised about human behavioural, cognitive, and biological characteristics that can be validly applied to specification, design, evaluation, operation, maintenance of products, jobs tasks, and systems to enhance safe, effective, and satisfying use by individuals, groups and organizations». [9].
While aviation had been born of civilian initiatives, it was not until the beginning of World War 1 (WW1) that aircraft started to be seen as a product with a real role to play rather than just as a novelty item. Prior to WW1 the focus of aviation psychology was on the aviator himself, but the war shifted the focus onto the aircraft, in particular, the design of controls and displays, the effects of altitude and environmental factors on the pilot. Military requirements rapidly developed the role of aircraft as a military vehicle. In the early days of WW1 aircraft were used as battle field observation platforms, but quickly became weapons of war when they were used to drop bombs and shoot down enemy aircraft. Military commanders quickly became interested in trying to reduce the number of aircraft and aircrew that they were losing as a result of their pilots «individual deficiencies». It could be claimed that these realisations gave birth to the practice of human factors in accident investigation. 
It was recognised very early in the development of aviation that not all humans were as capable as each other when it came to successfully and repeatedly flying an aircraft, therefore based on many different criteria,  selection processes became a more important and scientific process then ever. However, it was also recognised that even having selected the candidates with what was felt to be the necessary qualities they still make errors which lead to accidents and incidents. Many of those occurrences were attributed to a lack of training and so pilot training became a focus of limiting human performance variability, particularly as the aircraft became bigger, faster and more complicated.
While human factors continued to develop in the areas of ergonomics, pilot 
selection and training, it became clearer that human error and accidents in aviation were related to such processes as pilot judgement, cognition and sensory perception. While these processes all have a physiological base, they are all psychological processes. As such, human factors started to draw heavily on what is now commonly called «aviation psychology».
After World War 1, the construction and operation of aircraft again became a major civilian interest. The early twenties also saw the introduction of the first civilian airlines and air mail services. During this period, human factors or ergonomics continued to develop, although as yet not formally given a separate title.
To reduce danger, and to help operators to select pilots that were better suited to instrument flying, an American, Edwin Albert Link, built the Link Trainer which today is generally recognised as the forerunner to model flight simulators which are used in training by most if not all airlines and military aviation groups throughout the world. Another significant development was in the civilian sector, where the effects of illumination on worker productivity were examined. This led to the identification of the Hawthorne Effect, which suggested that motivational factors could significantly influence human performance.
Prior to World War II, the focus was «designing the human to fit the machine» (i.e., trial and error), instead of designing machines to fit the human. With the advent of the Second World War, and armed with the knowledge of aircraft losses during the First World War, and recognising that during the 1920s and 30s aircraft and aircraft operations had changed significantly, both the British and the Americans started to invest heavily in applying human factors knowledge to aviation operations. These efforts now not only drew on practitioners such as pilots and engineers, but also increasingly on academic specialist from Universities.   
The scope of human factors expanded rapidly, applying knowledge and techniques to better pilot selection in the form of better and more stringent medical and psychological standards. New psychometric measures were developed and devices such as flight simulators were developed and used. Research was undertaken into spatial disorientation, fatigue and pilot information processing abilities etc. However, these developments continued to focus on individual pilots. These developments while providing a wealth of new information tended to reinforce the concept of individual «рilot еrror» as being the only real explanation for all accidents that did not involve a mechanical failure of the aircraft. 
The two decades following the end of World War II saw the continuation of military-sponsored research, driven in large part, by the Cold War. At the end of WW2, academic research into human factors continued in a civilian context and expanded into many Universities throughout the world.
In the mid 1970s, the focus of human factors in research, investigation and line operations started to expand to consider broader human factor issues. The initial research looked at how aircraft captains allocate tasks between crew members and how crew members responded to each other. This research showed that there were many errors that occurred because of poor crew coordination. The origin of these issues could involve personality, cultural biases, communications skills and many other factors that influence the way groups of people interact with each other and how they go about managing and solving problems. 
The development of CRM (Crew Resource Management) training initially focused on the flight crew, but it was soon realised that while communications and good resource management was critical to the cockpit, the problems between the flight crew and the other members of the crew could be just as critical. As a result Cockpit Resource Management evolved into «Crew Resource Management». 
CRM as developed by Professor Robert Helmreich, at the University of Texas, is now practiced by most airlines. It is also now applied broadly from flight and cabin crew to maintenance staff and air traffic controllers, in fact any group of people who may be directly involved in the operational safety of the aircraft.  
CRM is now considered to be in its «Fifth Generation» of development and has lead to a number of spin off practices. One of the main current focuses within contemporary CRM is «threat and error management» where both operating crews and management are trained to analyse errors in great detail to not only identify errors after they have been made, but also to recognise threats that can lead to errors before the error occurs. This process not only allows individuals to learn but also allows the organisation to learn and help put in place affective mitigation strategies to identified threats.
With the expanded focus of human factors now considering not only the actions of individuals, but also groups of individuals, be they operators or managers of operators, a new concept and term started to develop. Investigation authorities started to use the term «systemic investigations». This term simply referred to an investigation with a broader focus. Such investigations look at the entire system that support the operation of the aircraft that may have been involved in an accident or incident, not just at those things or people who were proximal to the accident or incident. This field has further expanded with the development of the computer and computer applications.
Human factors started with the development of aviation and was initially concerned only with the design of equipment and the training of pilots. It now deals with a much broader range of human science issues and has expanded its focus from individuals to entire organisations and systems. It is concerned with every level and every function within organisations that create the environment in which individuals design, construct, maintain and operate complex systems.  
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